ility, divisibility and resistance. He
explains also the nature of notions, and leaves it to be understood that
_universals_ indicate only the resemblances which exist between
_individuals_; that we understand by _ideas_ only that which is known
through an immediate sensation, and that the rest is known to us only
through relations with these ideas. But when he admits that we have no idea
of God, of spirit, of substance, he does not appear to have observed
sufficiently that we have immediate apperception of substance and of spirit
in our apperception of ourselves, and that the idea of God is found in[409]
the idea of ourselves through a suppression of the limits of our
perfections, as extension taken in an absolute sense is comprised in the
idea of a globe. He is right also in asserting that our simple ideas at
least are innate, and in rejecting the _Tabula rasa_ of Aristotle and of
Mr. Locke. But I cannot agree with him that our ideas have scarce any more
relation to things than words uttered into the air or writings traced upon
paper have to our ideas, and that the bearing of our sensations is
arbitrary and _ex instituto_, like the signification of words. I have
already indicated elsewhere why I am not in agreement with our Cartesians
on that point.

5. For the purpose of advancing to the first Cause, the author seeks a
criterion, a distinguishing mark of truth; and he finds it in the force
whereby our inward assertions, when they are evident, compel the
understanding to give them its consent. It is by such a process, he says,
that we credit the senses. He points out that the distinguishing mark in
the Cartesian scheme, to wit, a clear and distinct perception, has need of
a new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct, and that the congruity
or non-congruity of ideas (or rather of terms, as one spoke formerly) may
still be deceptive, because there are congruities real and apparent. He
appears to recognize even that the inward force which constrains us to give
our assent is still a matter for caution, and may come from deep-rooted
prejudices. That is why he confesses that he who should furnish another
criterion would have found something very advantageous to the human race. I
have endeavoured to explain this criterion in a little _Discourse on Truth
and Ideas_, published in 1684; and although I do not boast of having given
therein a new discovery I hope that I have expounded things which were only
confusedly recogniz