es thus from the event itself; since
God made the universe, it was not possible to do better. Such management,
far from being contrary to goodness, has rather been prompted by supreme
goodness itself. This objection with its solution might have been inferred
from what was said with regard to the first objection; but it seemed
advisable to touch upon it separately.
OBJECTION VIII
Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free.
God cannot fail to choose the best.
Therefore God is not free.
ANSWER
I deny the major of this argument. Rather is it true freedom, and the most
perfect, to be able to make the best use of one's free will, and always to
exercise this power, without being turned aside either by outward force or
by inward passions, whereof the one enslaves our bodies and the other our
souls. There is nothing less servile and more befitting the highest degree
of freedom than to be always led towards the good, and always by one's own
inclination, without any constraint and without any displeasure. And to
object that God therefore had need of external things is only a sophism. He
creates them freely: but when he had set before him an end, that of
exercising his goodness, his wisdom determined him to choose the means most
appropriate for obtaining this end. To call that a _need_ is to take the
term in a sense not usual, which clears it of all imperfection, somewhat as
one does when speaking of the wrath of God.
Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, but that he obeys[387]
always, because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself:
_semel jussit, semper paret_. But he had better have said, that God always
commands and that he is always obeyed: for in willing he always follows the
tendency of his own nature, and all other things always follow his will.
And as this will is always the same one cannot say that he obeys that will
only which he formerly had. Nevertheless, although his will is always
indefectible and always tends towards the best, the evil or the lesser good
which he rejects will still be possible in itself. Otherwise the necessity
of good would be geometrical (so to speak) or metaphysical, and altogether
absolute; the contingency of things would be destroyed, and there would be
no choice. But necessity of this kind, which does not destroy the
possibility of the contrary, has the name by analogy only: it becomes
effective not through the mere essence of things, but thr
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