d with the defence of Natal had been arranging his
troops for him without consulting him, and had done it badly. Then came
the question of moving them back, and the probable "bad effect" was
raised as a scarecrow. But the reply to that was that the bad effect of
retreat is not half so bad as the bad effect of defeat, or of the
embarrassments of a position which, being strategically wrong, may
involve mishaps.

When a civil government moves troops in connection with war it ought to
move them to the right places; that is according to sound strategy or
sound military principles. In short, whoever deals in war ought to
understand war. The reader may think that a commonplace, but in reality
it is like too many commonplaces--a truth that very important people
forget at critical moments. The first principle of action in war is to
have two men to one at the decisive point. How comes it, then, that for
six weeks Sir George White has to defend Natal with one against two?
Evidently the first principle has been violated. It came about exactly
in the same way as the putting one of Sir George White's brigades at
Dundee. The Government managed it; it was a fragment of the civil view
of war. How long, then, the reader may ask, should the civil view of war
be allowed scope and when should the military view be called in? Let me
be permitted to alter the labels and instead of "military view" to say
"view based upon knowledge"; and instead of "civil view" to say, "view
not based upon knowledge." I think that all dealings in war should be
guided by the view based upon knowledge and that the other view should
be for ever left out of account.

My unpopular belief that nobody should meddle with the management of a
war unless he understands it is, I admit, most uncomfortable, for as a
war is always managed by the Government I am obliged to think that every
Government ought to understand war. But in this country the Government
is entrusted to a Committee of Peers and Members of Parliament, none of
whom is supposed to be able to take a military view of war. If my belief
is right, a British Cabinet is very liable to take a civilian view, and
the consequences might be awkward. In fact they are awkward, as the
South African war up to date abundantly reveals.

The military view of war is that it consists in the employment of force
to compel an adversary to do your will. The employment of force is
required in the management of a Nation's affairs whe