flank from which their
attack would be most dangerous, and seem to aim at interposing between
the parts of Sir C.F. Clery's force, and at a convergent attack in
superior strength upon his advance guard at Estcourt.

I should have expected the advance parties of Sir C.F. Clery's force to
have fallen back as the Boers approached. The attempt to keep up the
connection between the parts of a concentrating force by means of the
railway strikes me as very dangerous from the moment that the enemy is
in the neighbourhood. The important thing for Sir C.F. Clery is not
whether his battle takes place twenty miles nearer to Ladysmith or
twenty miles farther away, but that it should be an unmistakable
victory, so that after it the Boer force engaged should be unable to
offer any further serious hindrance to his advance. To gain an end of
this kind a general should not merely bring up all the troops from the
rear, falling back for them if necessary, but should take care that none
can be cut off by the enemy in his front. A decisive victory by Sir C.F.
Clery or by Sir Redvers Duller, who may feel this action to be so
important as to justify his presence, would leave no doubt as to the
issue of the war. An indecisive battle would postpone indefinitely the
relief of Ladysmith and leave the future of the campaign in suspense.
Defeat would be disastrous, for it would probably involve the ultimate
loss of Sir George White's force. For these reasons I regard the battle
shortly to be fought in Natal as the first decisive action of the war,
and am astonished that a larger proportion of Sir Redvers Buller's force
has not been sent to take part in it.

The whole business of a commander-in-chief in war is to find out the
decisive point and to have the bulk of his forces there in time. If he
can do that on the half-dozen occasions which make the skeleton of a
war he has fulfilled his mission. He never need do anything else, for
all the rest can be done by his subordinates. Not every commander
fulfils this simple task because not every one refuses to let himself be
distracted. All sorts of calls are made upon him to which he finds it
hard to be deaf; very often he is doubtful whether one or another
subordinate is competent, and then he is tempted to do that
subordinate's work for him. That is always a mistake because it means
neglect of the commander's own work, which is more important.

The task, though it appears simple is by no means easy, as