ur Army will govern you. The
only plan that will produce the result required is to give authority
over the making and using of the Army to a man or men who understand
War--War as it is to-day. In short, a Nation that is liable to War
requires men of War in its Government, and, in the case of Great
Britain, the place for them is in the Cabinet. The traditional practice
of having a civilian Minister inside the Cabinet with all the authority,
and a soldier with all the knowledge outside the Cabinet, was devised
for electioneering purposes, and not for war. The plan has answered its
object very well for many years, having secured Cabinets against any
intrusion of military wisdom upon their domestic party felicity. But now
that the times have changed, and that the chief business of a Cabinet is
to manage a war, it seems unwise to keep the military judgment locked
out. Party felicity was valuable some years ago when there was a demand
for it; but the fashions have changed. To-day the article in demand is
not eloquence nor the infallibility of "our side," whichever that may
be; the article in demand to-day is the organisation of victory. That is
not to be had at all the shops. Those who can supply it are very
special men, who must be found and their price paid. The Nation has
given bail for the production of this particular article, and if it is
not forthcoming in time the forfeit must be paid. The bail is the
British Empire.

MORE AWAKENING

_December 21st_, 1899

A week ago, while we were thinking over failure in the Cape Colony on
both lines of advance, we could still hope for success on what
circumstances had made the most important line, in Natal. But now there
has been failure in Natal also.

Of the battle of Colenso Sir Redvers Buller's telegraphic despatch,
though it probably does the commander less justice than he would have
received at the hands of any other narrator, gives an authoritative if
meagre account. The attack seems to have been planned rather as a
reconnaissance in force, to be followed up in case it should reveal
possibilities of victory, than as a determined effort on which
everything was to be staked. In all probability this form of action was
inevitable in the conditions. The Boers held a strong position, covered
in front by a river fordable at only two points. Such a position can
hardly be reconnoitred except by attack. It could not be turned except
by a long flank march, which, if succes