g out to build an extra fleet--what for? Because the Austrian
Government, like the German and Italian Governments, know, what our
recent Governments have never known, that Great Britain has for two or
three centuries been the balance weight or fly-wheel of the European
machine, by reason of the prescience with which her Navy was handled.
Those Governments now see that statesmanship has gone from us; they
divine that the great Navy we now possess cannot be used by a timid and
ignorant Government, and that no reliance can be placed upon Great
Britain to play her own true game. Accordingly, they see that they must
strengthen their own navies with a view to the possible collapse of the
British Power. In the near future the maintenance of the British Empire
depends upon the Nation's having a Government at once far-seeing and
resolute, capable of great resolves and prompt action. Of such a
Government there is, however, no immediate prospect. The present Cabinet
has given its testimonials: a challenge sent to the Boers by a
Government that did not know it was challenging anyone, that did not
know the adversary's strength, nor his determination to fight; and a war
begun in military ignorance displayed by the Cabinet, and carried on by
half measures until the popular determination compelled three-quarter
measures. Does anyone suppose that this Cabinet, that did not know its
mind till the Boers declared war, knows or will know its mind about the
conflict with Russia in Asia, or about any other of the troubles,
foreseen and unforeseen, which await us? A victory in Natal would save
the Cabinet and drown the voices of its critics; and in that case the
present leaders will infallibly go halting and irresolute into the
greater contests that are coming. A defeat in Natal would destroy the
Government at once if there were before the public a single man in whose
judgment and character there was confidence; but there is no such man,
and, as the Opposition leaders are discredited by their conduct in
regard to the quarrel with the Boers, the present set will remain at
their posts to continue the traditional policy of waiting to be driven
by public opinion. The Nation, therefore, has before it a necessary task
as urgent as that of reinforcing the Army in the field, which is to find
the man in whose judgment as to war and policy as well as in whose
character it can place confidence.

The man to be trusted is, unfortunately, not Lord Wolseley.