ut from the Orange River to
Bloemfontein there would be a march of one hundred and twenty miles, and
the Boer army was not at Bloemfontein. There was a probability that when
the British force reached Bloemfontein the Boer army might leave Natal,
but the probability did not amount to certainty; it rested upon a guess
or hypothesis of what the Boer general or the Free State Government and
its troops would think. Supposing, however, that these persons did not
think as was expected; that they determined to complete the conquest of
Natal (except Durban, which was protected by the fleet), and to keep
their grip upon Ladysmith, at any rate until the British force was
nearing the passes of the Drakensberg or crossing the Vaal, and then,
but not till then, to retreat to Middleburg? In that case the purpose of
the advance, the crushing of the Boer army, might be deferred for a very
long time, and meanwhile every one of the minor tasks, except the relief
of Kimberley and the repulse of the Free State invaders of the Cape,
would be left over. Ladysmith might fall, and its fall stimulate the
Cape rising and endanger the communications of the British force
advancing north of the Orange River.

These were the two plans, and I confess that my own judgment at the
beginning of November inclined to the former, though, as I am aware
that most of those whose strategical judgment I respect hold a decided
opinion the other way, I cannot be dogmatic. The prevalent opinion
attaches more importance than I can persuade myself to do to the
difficulties of the hilly and mountainous country of northern Natal.
There is, moreover, a reserve imposed upon observers at home by our
ignorance of the state of the transport services of the British forces.
No concentration of troops is profitable if the troops when collected
cannot be fed.

Subject to these reserves it may be said that Sir Redvers Buller at the
beginning of November had to choose between two lines of operations,
that by Natal and that by the Cape. The cardinal principle is that you
must never divide your force between two lines of operations unless it
is large enough to give you on each of the two lines an assured
superiority to the enemy's whole force. Sir Redvers Buller's design,
however, violated this principle. He neither determined upon action with
all his might through the Cape Colony nor upon action with all his
might through Natal, but divided his effort, directing four of his seven