the Boer position at Magersfontein, so that it need not
be carried by a frontal attack. But it also places the British force on
the direct line of the Boer communications with Bloemfontein, and if
Commandant Cronje values these communications he must either make a
precipitate retreat by Boshof, offering his flank during the process to
attack by French, or must attack the sixth and seventh divisions on
their march from the Riet to the Modder. But in either case he has to
reckon with the Guards and ninth divisions which are not mentioned in
the telegrams, but which are assuredly not idle. Lord Methuen has long
held a crossing on to the peninsula or Doab between the two rivers, and
the advance of a division into this peninsula must compel the prompt
evacuation of Jacobsdal or bring about the ruin of any Boer force there,
while at the same time it would increase the weight of troops that
intervene between Magersfontein and Bloemfontein. A single division is a
more than ample force to cover the British railhead at Modder River.
Commandant Cronje may elect to fight where he is, which would be to
court disaster, for he would be attacked from the east in great force,
with no retreat open except to the west away from his base, and with a
considerable river, the Vaal, to cross. Such a retreat after a lost
battle and under the pressure of pursuit would be ruin to his army. He
may move off by Boshof, but that would be impracticable unless the
start were made soon after the first news of the British advance. On
Wednesday he would have only the mounted troops to deal with; even on
Thursday (to-day) the sixth division could hardly be used with effect on
the north bank of the Modder, but on Friday he would have the sixth and
seventh divisions to reckon with. Probably his best course would be to
retire before he can be attacked to Barkly, on the right bank of the
Vaal. He would there be in a position most difficult to attack, and yet
his presence there on the flank of any British advance either to the
north or to the east would make it impossible to neglect him. His
decision has been taken before now, or this opinion would have been
suppressed out of deference to the anxiety of those who imagine that
strategical advice is telegraphed from London to the Boer headquarters.

Of the effect of the new move upon the general course of the war it
would be premature to enlarge. We must wait and see the close of the
first act. The most effective i