h cannot be ascertained from the ballot box, but only by the
hard labour of prolonged study after previous training. For success in
war depends upon the troops being armed with the best weapons of the
day, upon their being trained to use them in the most appropriate
manner, upon the amount of knowledge and practice possessed by the
generals; upon a correct estimate of the enemy's forces, of their
armament and tactics, and upon a true insight into the policy of the
Powers with which quarrels are possible.
A year ago it was known to many persons in this country, and the
Government was informed by those whose, special duty it was to give the
information, that the Boer States aimed at supremacy in South Africa,
that they were heavily armed, that a large force would be required to
defeat them, and that to postpone the quarrel would make the inevitable
war still more difficult. It was well understood also that the
difficulty lay in the probability that if a small force were sent it
would be exposed to defeat, while if a large one were sent its despatch
would precipitate the war. These were the facts known more than a year
ago to those who wanted to know. Is it not clear that the Government's
management has been based upon something other than the facts; that the
Government was all the time basing its action not upon the facts but
upon speculations as to what might come out of future ballot-boxes? They
were attending to their own mission, that of keeping in office, but
neglecting the Nation's necessary business, that of dealing promptly
with the Boer assault upon British supremacy in South Africa. The
explanation is simple. Every man in the Cabinet has devoted his life
since he has been grown up to the art of getting votes for his party,
either at the polls or in Parliament. Not one of them has given his
twenty years to studying the art of managing a war.
But a war cannot possibly be well managed by anyone who is not a master
of the art. Now and then there has been success by an amateur--a person
who, without being a soldier by profession, has made himself one; such a
person, for example, as Cromwell. Apart from rare instances of that
sort, the only plan for a Government which does not include among its
members a soldier, professional or amateur, is to choose a soldier of
one class or the other and to delegate authority to him. But this plan
does not always succeed, because sometimes a Government composed of men
who know no
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