he only idea
was defending Natal. But this defence was not thought of as part of a
war. The idea never seems to have occurred to the Government that the
need for defence in Natal could not arise except in case of war, and
that then to defend Natal would be impracticable except by beating the
Boer army. Accordingly, the handful of troops in Natal were posted
without regard to the probable outlines of the war, and therefore,
wrongly posted. The consequence was that when war came they could not be
concentrated except at the cost of fighting and loss, and of a retreat
which gave the enemy the belief that he had won a victory. Even then the
point held--Ladysmith--was too far north and liable to be turned. All
these mistakes, made before Sir George White arrived, were evident to
that general when he first reached Ladysmith, but they could not then be
remedied, and he had to do, and has done, the best he could in the
circumstances. The fact of Sir George White's investment compels Sir
Redvers Buller to begin his campaign with the effort to relieve him, and
the fact that Kimberley is held by a weak force compels him to divide
his force when his one desire certainly must have been to keep it
united. In the expected battle at Mooi River Sir Redvers Buller will be
trying to make up for the faulty arrangements of September. The desire
to hold as much of the railway as possible--also due to the false
position of Sir George White's force--has, perhaps, led General
Hildyard to spread out his force over too long a line. But, in spite of
the difficulties created by errors at the start, I am not without hopes
that these remarks will soon be put out of date by a decisive British
victory.
FIGHTING AGAINST ODDS
_November 29th_, 1899
Two factors in the present war were impressed upon my mind at the
beginning: first, that the British Army was never in better condition as
regards the zeal and skill of its officers, the training and discipline
of the men, and the organisation of the field services; secondly, that
the Government had deliberately handicapped that Army by giving the
Boers many weeks' clear start in which to try with their whole forces to
overwhelm the small British parties sent out at haphazard to delay them.
The whole course of events up to now has been underlining these two
judgments. The British troops gave proof of their qualities at Talana
Hill, at Elandslaagte, and on the trying retreat from Dundee. There is
no
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