nd Imperialist rather than
Conservative or Liberal.
THE DELAY OF REINFORCEMENTS
_December 7th_, 1899
The conditions in South Africa are still critical; indeed, more so than
ever. There are three campaigns in progress, and, though there are good
grounds for hoping that in each case the balance will turn in favour of
the British, the hope rests rather upon faith than upon that numerical
superiority which it is the first duty of a Government to give to its
generals.
Lord Methuen's advance came to a pause after the battle of Modder River,
now nine days ago. There appear to have been good reasons for the delay.
First of all, it is necessary that when, or soon after, Kimberley is
reached the railway to De Aar should be available both for the removal
of non-combatants, and for the transport of provisions, ammunition and
guns. This involves the repair in some way of the bridge at Modder
River. Next, it was proved-by that battle, in which the Boer force was
large enough to make the victory most difficult, and by the arrival
after the battle of fresh Boer forces, that Lord Methuen's force was not
strong enough for its work. If a whole day and heavy loss were needed to
bring about the retreat of eleven thousand Boers from a prepared
position it might be impracticable for Lord Methuen without more force
to drive away fifteen or eighteen thousand Boers from a prepared
position at Spytfontein, and the possibility of such a body of Boers
being at that point had to be reckoned with. Lord Methuen needed more
infantry, more artillery, and more cavalry. Of none of the three arms
had General Forestier-Walker any abundant supply. If he has sent on,
besides a cavalry regiment, the whole of the Highland brigade and three
batteries of artillery, Lord Methuen would be none too strong. It is
essential that, having started, he should defeat the Boers again and
reach Kimberley, for a failure would be a disaster. I have great
confidence in Lord Methuen and his troops; what determination and
bravery can do they will accomplish, and I feel pretty sure that in a
day or two we shall have news of another victory and of the relief of
Kimberley. But why has the paramount power in South Africa sent a fine
general and splendid troops to face heavy odds and to run the risk of
finding themselves over-tasked by superior numbers?
If we put the most liberal construction on General Walker's account of
what he has done to reinforce Lord Methueh th
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