r
20th.

The present situation is the necessary outcome of the Government's
action between the beginning of June and October 7th, when the orders
for calling out the Reserves and for mobilisation were issued. The
Cabinet's decisions involved that Sir George White with his small force
should have to bear the brunt of the Boer attack from the outbreak of
hostilities until the time when the Army Corps should be landed and
ready to move. That was at least five weeks[C] of which three have
elapsed, and in the three weeks Sir George White, after one or two
initial mishaps of no great consequence by themselves, is invested at
Ladysmith, while Mafeking and Kimberley are waiting for relief, and the
Free State Boers are invading the northern provinces of Cape Colony and
trying to enlist the doubtful Dutch farmers. This is not a pleasant
situation for the Nation that declares itself the paramount Power in
South Africa. Three questions may be discussed with regard to it: What
are the risks still run, what are the probabilities, and how can we help
to prevent such a situation from recurring?

To see what has been risked on the chance that the force under Sir
George White may hold its own we must look from the Boer side. The Boer
commander hopes, or ought to hope, to destroy Sir George White's force
before it can be relieved. He has a chance of succeeding in this, for an
investing force has with modern arms a great advantage over the force it
surrounds. The outside circle is so much larger than the inside one that
it can bring many more rifles into play; it exposes no flanks, and the
interior force cannot attack it without exposing one or both flanks.
With anything like equal skill and determination the surrounding force
is sure to win in time. But if the time is limited the surrounding force
must hurry the result by assaults, in which it loses the advantage of
the defensive. If Joubert and his men have the courage and determination
to make repeated assaults it may go hard with the defenders of
Ladysmith. But the defenders hitherto have had the counterbalancing
advantage of a superior artillery. I think it reasonable to expect that
with the better discipline of his force, its greater cohesion and
mobility and the high spirit which animates it, Sir George White will be
able to defy the Boers for many weeks. But suppose the unexpected to
happen, as it sometimes does in war, and Sir George White's resistance
to be overcome? Such a vic