es, more immediately, a certain homage
of the moral feelings, entirely distinct from the duties which he owes
to his fellow-men.

IV. From this chain of moral convictions, it is impossible to separate a
deep impression of continued existence, or of a state of being beyond
the present life,--and of that as a state of moral retribution.

* * * * *

The consideration of these important objects of belief will afterwards
occur to us in various parts of our inquiry. They are briefly stated
here, in reference to the place which they hold as First Truths, or
primary articles of moral belief, which arise by a natural and obvious
chain of sequence, in the moral conviction of every sound understanding.
For the truth of them we appeal not to any process of reasoning,
properly so called, but to the conviction which forces itself upon every
regulated mind. Neither do we go abroad among savage nations, to inquire
whether the impression of them be universal; for this may be obscured in
communities, as it is in individuals, by a course of moral degradation.
We appeal to the casuist himself, whether, in the calm moment of
reflection, he can divest himself of their power. We appeal to the
feelings of the man who, under the consciousness of guilt, shrinks from
the dread of a present Deity and the anticipation of a future reckoning.
But chiefly we appeal to the conviction of him, in whom conscience
retains its rightful supremacy, and who habitually cherishes these
momentous truths, as his guides in this life in its relation to the life
that is to come.

In applying to these important articles of belief the name of First
Truths, or primary principles of moral conviction, I do not mean to
ascribe to them any thing of the nature of innate ideas. I mean only
that they arise, with a rapid or instantaneous conviction entirely
distinct from what we call a process of reasoning, in every regulated
mind, when it is directed, by the most simple course of reflection, to
the phenomena of nature without, and to the moral feelings of which it
is conscious within. It appears to be a point of the utmost practical
importance, that we should consider them as thus arising out of
principles which form a part of our moral constitution; as it is in
this way only that we can consider them as calculated to influence the
mass of mankind. For, if we do not believe them to arise, in this
manner, by the spontaneous exercise of every u