iple, which has an
extensive influence on our conduct in regard to both these classes of
emotions. This is _Self-love_;--which leads us to seek our own
protection, comfort, and advantage. It is a sound and legitimate
principle of action when kept in its proper place;--when allowed to
usurp an undue influence, it degenerates into selfishness; and it then
interferes in a material degree with the exercise of the affections, or,
in other words, with our duty to other men.

IV. We have next to attend to the fact, that every desire is not
followed by actual volition towards obtaining the object;--and that
every affection does not lead to the conduct which might flow from it.
Thus a man may feel a desire which, after consideration, he determines
not to gratify. Another may experience an affection, and not act upon
it;--he may feel benevolence or friendship, and yet act, in the
particular case, with cold selfishness;--or he may feel the impulse of
anger, and yet conduct himself with forbearance. When, therefore, we go
another step backwards in the chain of moral sequences, our attention is
directed to certain principles by which the determination is actually
decided,--either according to the desire or affection which is present
to the mind, or in opposition to it. This brings us to a subject of the
utmost practical importance:--and the principles, which thus decide the
determination of the mind, are referable to two heads.

(1.) The determination or decision may arise out of a certain state of
arrangement of the moving powers themselves, in consequence of which
some one of them has acquired a predominating influence in the moral
system. This usually results from habit, or frequent indulgence, as we
shall see in a subsequent part of our inquiry. A man, for example, may
desire an object, but perceive that the attainment would require a
degree of exertion greater than he is disposed to devote to it. This is
the preponderating love of ease, a branch of self-love. Another may
perceive that the gratification would impair his good name, or the
estimation in which he is anxious to stand in the eyes of other
men;--this is the predominating love of approbation, or regard to
character. In the same manner, a third may feel that it would interfere
with his schemes of avarice or ambition,--and so in regard to the other
desires. On a similar principle, a man may experience a strong impulse
of anger, but perceive that there would be danger in