considered in the light of all the latest knowledge that we possess,
and by the best faculties of thinking that we (the heirs of all the
ages) are able to bring to bear upon it. I shall, therefore, only allude
to the history of anthropopsychism in so far as I may find it necessary
to do so for the sake of elucidating my argument.

And here it is needful to consider first what Paley called 'the state of
the argument' before the Darwinian epoch. This is clearly and tersely
presented by Paley in his classical illustration of finding a watch upon
a heath--an illustration so well known that I need not here re-state it.
I will merely observe, therefore, that it conveys, as it were in one's
watch-pocket, the whole of the argument from design; and that it is not
in my opinion open to the stricture which was passed upon it by Mill
where he says,--'The inference would not be from marks of design, but
because I already know by direct experience that watches are made by
men.' This appears to me to miss the whole point of Paley's meaning, for
there would be obviously no argument at all unless he be understood to
mean that the evidence of design which is supposed to be afforded by
examination of the watch, is supposed to be afforded by this examination
only, and not from any of the direct knowledge alluded to by Mill. For
the purposes of the illustration, it must clearly be assumed that the
finder of the watch has no previous or direct knowledge touching the
manufacture of watches. Apart from this curious misunderstanding, Mill
was at one with Paley upon the whole subject.

Again, it is no real objection to the argument or illustration to say,
as we often have said, that it does not account for the watchmaker. The
object of the argument from design is to _prove_ the existence of a
designer: not to _explain_ that existence. Indeed, it would be suicidal
to the whole argument in its relation to Theism, if the possibility of
any such explanation were entertained; for such a possibility could only
be entertained on the supposition that the being of the Deity admits of
being explained--i.e. that the Deity is not ultimate.

Lastly, the argument is precisely the same as that which occurs in
numerous passages of Scripture and in theological writings all over the
world down to the present time. That is to say, everywhere in organic
nature we meet with innumerable adaptations of means to ends, which in
very many cases present a degree of refi