it is what
it is, so far as the question of its physical causation is concerned.
But where the question is, Supposing the physical causation ultimately
due to Mind, what are we to infer concerning the character of the Mind
which has adopted this method of causation?--then we again reach the
answer that, so far as we can judge from a conscientious examination of
these facts, this Mind does not show that it is of a nature which in man
we should call moral. Of course behind the physical appearances there
may be a moral justification, so that from these appearances we are not
entitled to say more than that from the fact of its having chosen a
method of physical causation leading to these results, it has presented
to us the appearance, as before observed, of caring for animal
perfection to the exclusion of animal enjoyment, and even to the total
disregard of animal suffering.
In conclusion, it is of importance to insist upon a truth which in
discussions of this kind is too often disregarded--viz. that all our
reasonings being of a character relative to our knowledge, our
inferences are uncertain in a degree proportionate to the extent of our
ignorance; and that as with reference to the topics which we have been
considering our ignorance is of immeasurable extent, any conclusions
that we may have formed are, as Bishop Butler would say, 'infinitely
precarious.' Or, as I have previously presented this formal aspect of
the matter while discussing the teleological argument with Professor Asa
Gray,--'I suppose it will be admitted that the validity of an inference
depends upon the number, the importance, and the definiteness of the
things or ratios known, as compared with the number, importance, and
definiteness of the things or ratios unknown, but inferred. If so, we
should be logically cautious in drawing inferences from the natural to
the supernatural: for although we have the entire sphere of experience
from which to draw an inference, we are unable to gauge the probability
of the inference when drawn--the unknown ratios being confessedly of
unknown number, importance, and degree of definiteness: the whole orbit
of human knowledge is insufficient to obtain a parallax whereby to
institute the required measurements or to determine the proportion
between the terms known and the terms unknown. Otherwise phrased, we may
say--as our knowledge of a part is to our knowledge of a whole, so is
our inference from that part to the reality
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