it has thereby been explained
_in toto_--forgetting that it has only been explained up to the point
where such causation is concerned, and that the real question of
ultimate causation has merely been thus postponed. And assuredly beyond
this point there is an infinitude of mystery sufficient to satisfy the
most exacting mystic. For even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimate
analysis all natural causation is inexplicable.

Logically regarded the advance of science, far from having weakened
religion, has immeasurably strengthened it. For it has proved the
uniformity of natural causation. The so-called natural sphere has
increased at the expense of the 'super-natural.' Unquestionably. But
although to lower grades of culture this always seems a fact inimical to
religion, we may now perceive it is quite the reverse, since it merely
goes to abolish the primitive or uncultured distinction in question.

It is indeed most extraordinary how long this distinction has held sway,
or how it is the ablest men of all generations have quietly assumed that
when once we know the natural causation of any phenomenon, we therefore
know all about it--or, as it were, have removed it from the sphere of
mystery altogether, when, in point of fact, we have only merged it in a
much greater mystery than ever.

But the answer to our astonishment how this distinction has managed to
survive so long lies in the extraordinary effect of custom, which here
seems to slay reason altogether; and the more a man busies himself with
natural causes (e.g. in scientific research) the greater does this
slavery to custom become, till at last he seems positively unable to
perceive the real state of the case--regarding any rational thinking
thereon as chimerical, so that the term 'meta-physical,' even in its
etymological sense as super-sensuous or beyond physical causation,
becomes a term of rational reproach. Obviously such a man has written
himself down, if not an ass, at all events a creature wholly incapable
of rationally treating any of the highest problems presented either by
nature or by man.

On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between
'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory
all causation is but the action of the Divine Will. And if we draw any
distinction between such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate,' we can only
mean this as valid in relation to mankind--i.e. in relation to our
experience. F