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l causation. Now it can be proved that this more ultimate question is [scientifically] unanswerable. Therefore both sides may denominate natural causation _x_--an unknown quantity. 4. Hence the whole controversy ought to be seen by both sides to resolve itself into this--is or is not the will determined by _x_? And, if this seems but a barren question to debate, I do not undertake to deny the fact. At the same time there is clearly this real issue remaining--viz. Is the will self-determining, or is it determined--i.e. _from without_? 5. If determined from without, is there any room for freedom, in the sense required for saving the doctrine of moral responsibility? And I think the answer to this must be an unconditional negative. 6. But, observe, it is not one and the same thing to ask, Is the will entirely determined from without? and Is the will entirely determined by natural causation (_x_)? For the unknown quantity _x_ may very well include _x'_, if by _x'_ we understand all the unknown ingredients of personality. 7. Hence, determinists gain no advantage over their adversaries by any possible proof (at present impossible) that all acts of will are due to natural causation, unless they can show the nature of the latter, and that it is of such a nature as supports their conclusion. For aught we at present know, the will may very well be free in the sense required, even though all its acts are due to _x_. 8. In particular, for aught we know to the contrary, all may be due to _x'_, i.e. all causation may be of the nature of will (as, indeed, many systems of philosophy maintain), with the result that every human will is of the nature of a First Cause. In support of which possibility it may be remarked that most philosophies are led to the theory of a _causa causarum_ as regards _x_. 9. To the obvious objection that with a plurality of first causes--each the _fons et origo_ of a new and never-ending stream of causality--the cosmos must sooner or later become a chaos by cumulative intersection of the streams, the answer is to be found in the theory of monism[53]. 10. Nevertheless, the ultimate difficulty remains which is depicted in my essay on the 'World as an Eject[54].' But this, again, is merged in the mystery of Personality, which is only known as an inexplicable, and seemingly ultimate, fact. 11. So that the general conclusion of the whole matter must be--pure agnosticism. FOOTNOTES: [47] [Here
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