it is
much like the thought of Peter Bell about the primrose[44].' Now, both
these classes are logical, since both, as to their religion, adopt an
attitude of pure agnosticism, not only in theory, but also in practice.
What, however, have we to say of the third class, which Spencer does
not mention, although it is, I think, the largest, viz. of those
scientific men who expressly abstain from drawing a line of division
between science and religion [and then judge of religion purely on the
principles and by the method of science[45]]?
There are two opposite casts of mind--the mechanical (scientific, &c.)
and the spiritual (artistic, religious, &c.). These may alternate even
in the same individual. An 'agnostic' has no hesitation--even though he
himself keenly experience the latter--that the former only is worthy of
trust. But a _pure_ agnostic must know better, as he will perceive that
there is nothing to choose between the two in point of trustworthiness.
Indeed, if choice has to be made the mystic might claim higher authority
for his direct intuitions.
Mr. Herbert Spencer has well said, in the opening section of his
Synthetic Philosophy, that wherever human thought appears to be
radically divided, [there must be truth on both sides and that the]
'reconciliation' of opposing views is to be found by emphasizing that
ultimate element of truth which on each side underlies manifold
differences. More than is generally supposed depends on points of view,
especially where first principles of a subject are in dispute. Opposite
sides of the same shield may present wholly different aspects[46].
Spencer alludes to this with special reference to the conflict between
science and religion; and it is in this same connexion that I also
allude to it. For it seems to me, after many years of thought upon the
subject, that the 'reconciliation' admits of being carried much further
than it has been by him. For he effects this reconciliation only to the
extent of showing that religion arises from the recognition of
fundamental mystery--which it may be proved that science also recognizes
in all her fundamental ideas. This, however, is after all little more
than a platitude. That our ultimate scientific ideas (i.e. ultimate
grounds of experience) are inexplicable, is a proposition which is
self-evident since the dawn of human thought. My aim is to carry the
'reconciliation' into much more detail and yet without quitting the
grounds of p
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