be regarded as due to some one
integrating principle; and that this, so far as we can see, is most
probably of the nature of mind. At least it must be allowed that we can
conceive of it under no other aspect; and that if any particular
adaptation in organic nature is held to be suggestive of such an agency,
the sum total of all adaptations in the universe must be held to be
incomparably more so. I shall not, however, dwell upon this theme since
it has been well treated by several modern writers, and with special
cogency by the Rev. Baden Powell. I will merely observe that I do not
consider it necessary to the display of this argument in favour of
Theism that we should speak of 'natural laws.' It is enough to take our
stand upon the [broadest] general fact that Nature is a system, and that
the order observable in this system is absolutely universal, eternally
enduring, and infinitely exact; while only upon the supposition of its
being such is our experience conceived as possible, or our knowledge
conceived as attainable.

Having thus stated as emphatically as I can that in my opinion no
explanation of natural order can be either conceived or named other than
that of intelligence as the supreme directing cause, I shall proceed to
two other questions which arise immediately out of this conclusion. The
first of these questions is as to the presumable character of this
supreme Intelligence so far as any data of inference upon this point are
supplied by our observation of Nature; and the other question is as to
the strictly formal cogency of any conclusions either with reference to
the existence or the character of such an intelligence[24]. I shall
consider these two points separately.

No sooner have we reached the conclusion that the only hypothesis
whereby the general order of Nature admits of being in any degree
accounted for is that it is due to a cause of a mental kind, than we
confront the fact that this cause must be widely different from anything
that we know of Mind in ourselves. And we soon discover that this
difference must be conceived as not merely of degree, however great, but
of kind. In other words, although we may conclude that the nearest
analogue of the _causa causarum_ given in experience is the human mind,
we are bound to acknowledge that in all fundamental points the analogy
is so remote that it becomes a question whether we are really very much
nearer the truth by entertaining it. Thus, for instance,