bay, which could possibly be
expected to be found in these several situations. Now, if a set of
adjustments so numerous and so delicate as those on which the relations
of every known form of life to the constituent gases of the atmosphere
are seen to depend, can thus be shown not necessarily to imply the
action of any disposing intelligence, how is it possible to conclude
that any less general exhibitions of adjustment imply this, so long as
every case of adjustment, whether or not ultimately due to design, is
regarded as proximately due to physical causes?

In view of these considerations, therefore, I think it is perfectly
clear that if the argument from teleology is to be saved at all, it can
only be so by shifting it from the narrow basis of special adaptations,
to the broad area of Nature as a whole. And here I confess that to my
mind the argument does acquire a weight which, if long and attentively
considered, deserves to be regarded as enormous. For, although this and
that particular adjustment in Nature may be seen to be proximately due
to physical causes, and although we are prepared on the grounds of the
largest possible analogy to infer that all other such particular cases
are likewise due to physical causes, the more ultimate question arises,
How is it that all physical causes conspire, by their united action, to
the production of a general order of Nature? It is against all analogy
to suppose that such an end as this can be accomplished by such means
as those, in the way of mere chance or 'the fortuitous concourse of
atoms.' We are led by the most fundamental dictates of our reason to
conclude that there must be some cause for this co-operation of causes.
I know that from Lucretius' time this has been denied; but it has been
denied only on grounds of _feeling_. No possible _reason_ can be given
for the denial which does not run counter to the law of causation
itself. I am therefore perfectly clear that the only question which,
from a purely rational point of view, here stands to be answered is
this--Of what nature are we to suppose the _causa causarum_ to be?

On this point only two hypotheses have ever been advanced, and I think
it is impossible to conceive that any third one is open. Of these two
hypotheses the earliest, and of course the most obvious, is that of
mental purpose. The other hypothesis is one which we owe to the
far-reaching thought of Mr. Herbert Spencer. In Chapter VII of his
_First Prin