being granted, will explain the phenomena of experience. On
the other hand, Religion is not in any way concerned with causation,
further than to assume that all things and all processes are ultimately
due to intelligent personality. Religion is thus, as Mr. Spencer says,
'an _a priori_ theory of the universe'--to which, however, we must add,
'and a theory which assumes intelligent personality as the originating
source of the universe.' Without this needful addition, a religion would
be in no way logically distinguished from a philosophy.
From these definitions, then, it clearly follows that in their purest
forms, Science and Religion really have no point of logical contact.
Only if Science could transcend the conditions of space and time, of
phenomenal relativity, and of all human limitations, only then could
Science be in a position to touch the supernatural theory of Religion.
But obviously, if Science could do this, she would cease to be Science.
In soaring above the region of phenomena and entering the tenuous aether
of noumena, her present wings, which we call her methods, would in such
an atmosphere be no longer of any service for movement. Out of time, out
of place, and out of phenomenal relation, Science could no longer exist
as such.
On the other hand, Religion in its purest form is equally incompetent to
affect Science. For, as we have already seen, Religion as such is not
concerned with the phenomenal sphere: her theory of ontology cannot have
any reference to the How of phenomenal causation. Hence it is evident
that, as in their purest or most ideal forms they move in different
mental planes, Science and Religion cannot exhibit interference.
Thus far the remarks which I have made apply equally to all forms of
Religion, as such, whether actual or possible, and in so far as the
Religion is _pure_. But it is notorious that until quite recently
Religion did exercise upon Science, not only an influence, but an
overpowering influence. Belief in divine agency being all but universal,
while the methods of scientific research had not as yet been distinctly
formulated, it was in previous generations the usual habit of mind to
refer any natural phenomenon, the physical causation of which had not
been ascertained, to the more or less immediate causal action of the
Deity. But we now see that this habit of mind arose from a failure to
distinguish between the essentially distinct characters of Science and
Religion as
|