he general situation, and the
action, in fact, taken at certain moments. The rest must be, for the
present, mainly matter of conjecture. With this word of caution, let
us now proceed to examine the policy of Germany.
The general situation we have already indicated. We have shown how the
armed peace, which is the chronic malady of Europe, had assumed during the
ten years from 1904 to 1914 that specially dangerous form which grouped the
Great Powers in two opposite camps--the Triple Alliance and the Triple
Entente. We have seen, in the case of Great Britain, France, Russia, and
Austria-Hungary, how they came to take their places in that constellation.
We have now to put Germany in its setting in the picture.
Germany, then, in the first place, like the other Powers, had occasion
to anticipate war. It might be made from the West, on the question of
Alsace-Lorraine; it might be made from the East, on the question of the
Balkans. In either case, the system of alliances was likely to bring into
play other States than those immediately involved, and the German Powers
might find themselves attacked on all fronts, while they knew in the
latter years that they could not count upon the support of Italy.
A reasonable prudence, if nothing else, must keep Germany armed and
apprehensive. But besides the maintenance of what she had, Germany was
now ambitious to secure her share of "world-power." Let us examine in
what spirit and by what acts she endeavoured to make her claim good.
First, what was the tone of public opinion in Germany during these
critical years?
[Footnote 1: Emile Ollivier, "L'Empire Liberal."]
8. _Opinion in Germany_.
Since the outbreak of the war the pamphlet literature in the countries of
the Entente has been full of citations from German political writers. In
England, in particular, the names and works of Bernhardi and of Treitschke
have become more familiar than they appear to have been in Germany prior to
the war. This method of selecting for polemical purposes certain tendencies
of sentiment and theory, and ignoring all others, is one which could be
applied, with damaging results, to any country in the world. Mr. Angell has
shown in his "Prussianism in England" how it might be applied to ourselves;
and a German, no doubt, into whose hands that book might fall would draw
conclusions about public opinion here similar to those which we have drawn
about public opinion in Germany. There is jingoism
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