again
present themselves for some time. Germany has finished the strengthening
of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the other hand,
she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments
with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The Wehrbeitrag
has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has
demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the
mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her
military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for several
years: at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its
deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency
in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is this arm that will decide
the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two
years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from
France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish
quarrels.[6]

It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have been in
the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other hand, as
late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign Office had
been working throughout for peace. Describing an interview he had had
on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:--

From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann
spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department for
Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had been
on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that
its views and counsels had not prevailed... A superior power intervened
to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to
Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet
was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the
war.[7]

Why was that ultimatum sent? According to the German apologists, it
was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the
critical moment, and so made war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt
that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by
mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed
out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at
Petrograd to his Government:--

As the result of