fore. I do not palliate the responsibility of Germany for
the outbreak of war. But that responsibility is embedded in and conditioned
by a responsibility deeper and more general--the responsibility of all the
Powers alike for the European anarchy.
If I have convinced the reader of this he will, I think, feel no difficulty
in following me to a further conclusion. Since the causes of this war, and
of all wars, lie so deep in the whole international system, they cannot be
permanently removed by the "punishment" or the "crushing" or any other
drastic treatment of any Power, let that Power be as guilty as you please.
Whatever be the issue of this war, one thing is certain: it will bring no
lasting peace to Europe unless it brings a radical change both in the
spirit and in the organization of international politics.
What that change must be may be deduced from the foregoing discussion of
the causes of the war. The war arose from the rivalry of States in the
pursuit of power and wealth. This is universally admitted. Whatever be the
diversities of opinion that prevail in the different countries concerned,
nobody pretends that the war arose out of any need of civilization, out of
any generous impulse or noble ambition. It arose, according to the popular
view in England, solely and exclusively out of the ambition of Germany to
seize territory and power. It arose, according to the popular German view,
out of the ambition of England to attack and destroy the rising power and
wealth of Germany. Thus to each set of belligerents the war appears as one
forced upon them by sheer wickedness, and from neither point of view has
it any kind of moral justification. These views, it is true, are both
too simple for the facts. But the account given in the preceding pages,
imperfect as it is, shows clearly, what further knowledge will only make
more explicit, that the war proceeded out of rivalry for empire between all
the Great Powers in every part of the world. The contention between France
and Germany for the control of Morocco, the contention between Russia and
Austria for the control of the Balkans, the contention between Germany and
the other Powers for the control of Turkey--these were the causes of the
war. And this contention for control is prompted at once by the desire for
power and the desire for wealth. In practice the two motives are found
conjoined. But to different minds they appeal in different proportions.
There is such a thin
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