e Slavs. The situation, and the danger with which it is
pregnant, may be realized by an Englishman if he will suppose St. George's
Channel and the Atlantic to be annihilated, and Ireland to touch, by a land
frontier, on the one side Great Britain, on the other the United States.
The friction and even the warfare which might have arisen between these two
great Powers from the plots of American Fenians may readily be imagined.
Something of that kind is the situation of Austria in relation to Serbia
and her protector, Russia. Further, Austria fears the occupation by any
Slav State of any port on the coast line of the Adriatic, and herself
desires a port on the Aegean. Add to this the recent German dream of the
route from Berlin to Bagdad, and the European importance of what would
otherwise be local disputes among the Balkan States becomes apparent.

During the period we are now considering the Balkan factor first came into
prominence with the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
1908. Those provinces, it will be remembered, were handed over to Austrian
protection at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Austria went in and policed
the country, much as England went in and policed Egypt, and, from the
material point of view, with similarly successful results. But, like
England in Egypt, Austria was not sovereign there. Formal sovereignty
still rested with the Turk. In 1909, during the Turkish revolution,
Austria took the opportunity to throw off that nominal suzerainty.
Russia protested, Austria mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro,
and war seemed imminent. But the dramatic intervention of Germany "in
shining armour" on the side of her ally resulted in a diplomatic victory
for the Central Powers. Austria gained her point, and war, for the moment,
was avoided. But such diplomatic victories are dangerous. Russia did not
forget, and the events of 1909 were an operative cause in the catastrophe
of 1914. In acting as she did in this matter Austria-Hungary defied the
public law of Europe, and Germany supported her in doing so.

The motives of Germany in taking this action are thus described, and
probably with truth, by Baron Beyens: "She could not allow the solidity
of the Triple Alliance to be shaken: she had a debt of gratitude to pay
to her ally, who had supported her at the Congress of Algeciras. Finally,
she believed herself to be the object of an attempt at encirclement by
France, England, and Russia, and was anxio