lease telegraph to Rome if you approve.'
"I replied that, 'if Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is evident that
the _casus foederis_ does not arise. It is an action that she undertakes on
her own account, since there is no question of defence, as no one thinks
of attacking her. It is necessary to make a declaration in this sense to
Austria in the most formal way, and it is to be wished that German action
may dissuade Austria from her most perilous adventure.'"[2]
Now this statement shows upon the face of it two things. One, that Austria
was prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European war; the other,
that the Italian ministers joined with Germany to dissuade her. They were
successful. Austria abandoned her project, and war was avoided. The episode
is as discreditable as you like to Austria. But, on the face of it, how
does it discredit Germany? More, of course, may lie behind; but no evidence
has been produced, so far as I am aware, to show that the Austrian project
was approved or supported by her ally.
The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded the second Balkan War, left
all the parties concerned dissatisfied. But, in particular, it left the
situation between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia more
strained than ever. It was this situation that was the proximate cause of
the present war. For, as we have seen, a quarrel between Austria and Russia
over the Balkans must, given the system of alliances, unchain a European
war. For producing that situation Austria-Hungary was mainly responsible.
The part played by Germany was secondary, and throughout the Balkan wars
German diplomacy was certainly working, with England, for peace. "The
diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse," says Baron Beyens, "applied itself,
above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire for intervention at
the Ballplatz." "The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of Vienna in
its tortuous policy of intrigues at Sofia and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann
said to me at the time, the Imperial Government contented itself with
maintaining its neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from
any intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their quarrels. There is
no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement."[3]
[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 240.]
[Footnote 2: It is characteristic of the way history is written in time of
war that M. Yves Guyot, citing Giolitti's statement, omits the references
to Germany
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