maintenance
of the open door. But the French enterprise was not abandoned. Disputes
with the natives such as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases,
led to fresh military intervention. At the same time, it was difficult to
secure the practical application of the principle of equal commercial
opportunity. An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby
both Powers were to share equally in contracts for public works, was
found in practice not to work. The Germans pressed for its application
to the new railways projected in Morocco. The French delayed, temporized,
and postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position
in Morocco. The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez.
Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the capital
(a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it
clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the country. The patience
of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir.
There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the
Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby Germany recognized a
French protectorate in Morocco in return for concessions of territory
in the French Congo. These are the bare facts of the Moroccan episode.
Much, of course, is still unrevealed, particularly as to the motives and
intentions of the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for instance, intend to
seize a share of Morocco when she sent the _Panther_ to Agadir? And was
that the reason of the vigour of the British intervention? Possibly, but
by no means certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Germany
had that intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between
France and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption
of Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of
Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the
French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy,
but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such
a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in
all the parties concerned.

The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length,
with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book "Morocco in Diplomacy."
The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various
Powers. But I do not believe that any instr