Paris, written in June 1914 (p. 34).
He suspected, as we saw, that the hand of Russia had imposed the three
years' service upon France.

What Baron Guillaume thought plausible must not the Germans have thought
plausible? Must it not have confirmed their belief in the "inevitability"
of a war--that belief which, by itself, has been enough to produce war
after war, and, in particular, the war of 1870? Must there not have been
strengthened in their minds that particular current among the many that
were making for war? And must not similar suspicions have been active,
with similar results, on the side of France and Russia? The armaments
engender fear, the fear in turn engenders armaments, and in that vicious
circle turns the policy of Europe, till this or that Power precipitates the
conflict, much as a man hanging in terror over the edge of a cliff ends by
losing his nerve and throwing himself over. That is the real lesson of the
rivalry in armaments. That is certain. The rest remains conjecture.

[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 75, and British White Paper,
No. 160.]

[Footnote 2: The account that follows is taken from the "Autobiography" of
Andrew D. White, the chairman of the American delegation. See vol. ii.,
chap. xiv. and following.]

[Footnote 3: Mr. Arthur Lee, late Civil Lord of the Admiralty, at
Eastleigh:--

"If war should unhappily break out under existing conditions the British
Navy would get its blow in first, before the other nation had time even to
read in the papers that war had been declared" (_The Times_, February 4,
1905).

"The British fleet is now prepared strategically for every possible
emergency, for we must assume that all foreign naval Powers are possible
enemies" (_The Times_, February 7, 1905).]

[Footnote 4: Sir Edwin Pears, "Forty Years in Constantinople," p.330.]

12. _Europe since the Decade 1890-1900_.

Let us now, endeavouring to bear in our minds the whole situation we have
been analysing, consider a little more particularly the various episodes
and crises of international policy from the year 1890 onwards. I take that
date, the date of Bismarck's resignation, for the reason already given (p.
42). It was not until then that it would have occurred to any competent
observer to accuse Germany of an aggressive policy calculated to disturb
the peace of Europe. A closer _rapprochement_ with England was, indeed,
the first idea of the Kaiser when he took over the re