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ertainly be given to Greece, "_pour la periode de la guerre et durant la periode des negociations de la paix_." [14] Prince George to King Constantine, 28 April/11 May, 1915. [15] _Ibid._ [16] Zographos to Greek Legations, Paris, London, Petrograd, 30 April/13 May, 1915. [17] Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915. M. Delcasse, then and for months afterwards, strove to gain over Bulgaria _coute que coute_, deploring the possession of Cavalla by Greece. See Deville, pp. 163, 218. [18] Alexandropoulos, Nish, 15/28 May, 1915. [19] Zographos to Greek Legation, Paris, 15/28 May, 1915. [20] Communication of Entente Powers to Greek Premier, 21 July/3 Aug.; Greek Premier's reply (No. 8118); Alexandropoulos, Nish, 23 July/5 Aug.; 25 July/7 Aug.; Communication by British Minister at Athens, 23 July/5 Aug., 1915. [21] See the _Nea Hellas_, 20, 21 March (O.S.), 1915; _Orations, passim_. [22] _Journal Officiel_, p. 76. To appreciate the community of sentiments between M. Venizelos and M. Delcasse fully, one must compare the above statement with that in _Orations_, pp. 68-9. The differences are equally instructive. The Venizelist orator, prudently suppresses from a Greek audience the fact that his Chief frustrated the General Staff's efforts to co-operate with Servia; he boldly surmises, on the other hand, that behind the General Staff's stipulations as to the sphere of Greek military action lurked the _arriere pensee_ to confront the Allies with the risk of provoking Bulgaria, whom they still regarded as a potential friend: so the stipulations were, as they were intended to be, unacceptable. Again, while M. Delcasse, addressing a French audience nervous about the Western Front, reckoned that the Entente contingents demanded by the Greek General Staff would amount to at least 600,000 or 800,000 men, M. Politis, less fantastically, estimates them at 450,000 men: this force, which Greece deemed necessary for success, it will be seen, was not far removed from that which France and England eventually wasted in failure. [23]Prince George to King Constantine, Paris, 28 April/11 May, 1915. [24] See M. Poincare's statement to the _Matin_, reproduced in the _Balkan Review_, Dec., 1920, p. 386; Deville, pp. 161, 168-9. {50} CHAPTER V On 23 August, M. Venizelos returned to power as a result of the General Elections held on June 13. The outcome of those elections proved how
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