Entente forces or to obtain their immediate
re-embarkation, the development of hostilities might very probably
compel the Germans and the Bulgars to cross her frontiers. After a
consultation, the Skouloudis Cabinet replied through the King that
Greece did not consent to a violation of her soil; but if the violation
bore no hostile character towards herself, she would refrain from
opposing it by force of arms on certain guarantees: that the Bulgars
should categorically renounce every claim to territories now in Greek
possession, that simultaneously with their entry into Macedonia Greece
should be allowed to occupy Monastir as a pledge for their exit, that
in no circumstance whatever should the King of Bulgaria or his sons
enter Salonica, {96} that all commands should be exclusively in German
hands, and so forth--altogether nineteen conditions, the principal
object of which was to ward off the danger of a permanent occupation,
but the effect of which would have been to hamper military operations
most seriously.
The German Government, perturbed by the extent and nature of the
guarantees demanded, referred the matter to Falkenhayn, who would only
grant three comprehensive assurances: to respect the integrity of
Greece, to restore the occupied territories at the end of the campaign,
and to pay an indemnity for all damage caused. On those terms, he
invited Greece to remove her army from Macedonia so as to avoid the
possibility of an accidental collision. The King refused, giving among
other reasons that such a concession had been denied to the Entente.
Thereupon Falkenhayn asked, as an alternative to a total evacuation,
that Greece should pledge herself to resist Entente landings in the
Gulfs of Cavalla and Katerini. Again Greece refused, on the ground
that this would involve the use of force against the Entente, whereas
she was determined not to abandon her neutrality as long as her
interests, in her own opinion, did not compel her so to do.[2]
After this answer, given on 27 January, 1916, conversations on the
subject ceased for about six weeks.
Thus it appears that during the period when the Allies were, or
professed to be, most nervous about the intentions of Greece, it was
the fear of Greek hostility, carefully nursed by Greek diplomacy, that
checked the Germans and the Bulgars from following up their advantage
and sweeping the Franco-British troops into the sea. It was the same
attitude of Greece that made the
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