4 March, 1916.
[12] Politis to Guillemin, 9/22 Feb., 1916.
[13] Considering the extent of the coast-line of Greece and the poverty
of her inhabitants, this would be incredible, were it not attested by
the Allies' Naval Commander-in-Chief, whose task it was to verify every
report transmitted to him: "_Jamais un seul de ses avis n'a ete reconnu
exact; la plupart etaient visiblement absurdes._" "_Malgre les
verifications les plus repetees jamais un seul de ces avis n'a ete
reconnu exact. Un certain nombre de coquins, incompetents mais malins,
vivaient du commerce de ces fausses nouvelles._"--Du Fournet, pp. 115,
304. Cp. also pp. 85, 270. The French Admiral of Patrols, Faton, and
the British Admiral Kerr, are equally emphatic in testifying "that all
these stories about supplying the submarines were fabrications."--See
Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, in the _Morning Post_, 13 Dec., 1920.
[14] J. C. Lawson, _Tales of Aegean Intrigue_, pp. 93-143.
[15] Du Fournet, p. 304.
[16] Du Fournet, pp. 112-16. In this work we find a full picture of
the French Secret Service. Unfortunately, or fortunately, no
authoritative record has been published of its British counterpart.
Mr. Lawson's account deals only with a provincial branch of the
establishment.
[17] _The New Europe_, 29 March, 1917; _Orations_, pp. 142-3.
{95}
CHAPTER IX
When M. Venizelos taunted M. Skouloudis with forgetting that he had
promised the Allies "not only simple neutrality, nor simply benevolent
neutrality, but most sincerely benevolent neutrality," the aged Prime
Minister, who apparently had a sense of humour, replied: "I do not know
how there can be such a thing as benevolent neutrality. A neutrality
really benevolent towards one of the belligerents is really malevolent
towards the other, consequently it is more or less undisguised
partiality. Between benevolence and malevolence there is no room for
neutrality." He only knew, he said, one kind of neutrality--the
absolute neutrality towards both belligerents.[1] And he lived up to
his knowledge so conscientiously that he earned the gratitude of
neither, but saw himself the sport of both.
No sooner had the Allies begun to fall back from Krivolak, than the
German Military Attache at Athens presented to King Constantine a
telegram from General von Falkenhayn, dated 29 November, 1915, in which
the Chief of the German General Staff intimated that, if Greece failed
to disarm the retreating
|