could not undertake a
struggle for the Constitution; he could only tender his resignation.

The King expostulated: "How can you resign in the face of a Bulgarian
mobilization? In these circumstances, as you know, we must not delay
even twenty-four hours. After all, who assures us that Bulgaria will
attack Servia? It is possible that she may maintain an armed
neutrality; in which case our disagreement vanishes, and you can stay
in power and carry on your policy." Whereupon M. Venizelos withdrew
his resignation.

Of course, he was not deluded by the Sofia Government's {55}
announcement of "armed neutrality," and he was determined to go for
Bulgaria at once. But how? In his own mind, as he had already
demonstrated to the King, no doubt existed that, if the Greeks attacked
the Bulgars, they had every chance of crushing them and even of taking
their capital. But there was that General Staff by whose opinions the
King set such store. They objected Servia's inability to contribute,
as she was bound by her Military Convention to do, 150,000 combatants.
Therefore, in order to meet this objection, he said: "Don't you think
we might ask the English and the French whether they could not furnish
150,000 combatants of their own?"

"Certainly," replied the King; "but they must send Metropolitan
(European) troops, not Colonials."

By his own account, M. Venizelos did not take this as meaning that the
King had agreed, if the English and the French supplied these
reinforcements, to depart from neutrality. He left Tatoi with a clear
perception of the divergence between their respective points of view:
while they both concurred in the need of instant mobilization, one was
for a defensive and the other for an offensive policy; but, as soon
appeared, not without hopes of converting his sovereign by some means
or other.

A busy, ambitious child of fortune never lets the grass grow under his
feet:

"I returned to the Ministry at 7 p.m.," goes on the curious record,
"and telephoned to the Entente Ministers to come and see me quickly.
When they came, I informed them that a mobilization Order was being
signed at that very moment and would be published that evening; but for
our further course I needed to know if the Powers were disposed to make
good the 150,000 combatants whom Servia was obliged by our Treaty to
contribute for joint action against Bulgaria. They promised to
telegraph, and immediately dispatched an extra urgent t