Parliamentary majority is absolute, and
recognized the right of the Crown to choose another Government; "On the
other hand," he said, "the necessary consequence of the formation of a
Cabinet not enjoying a majority in the Chamber is the dissolution of
the Chamber." [8] It was in pursuance {71} of this advice that the
King, who, as M. Venizelos on that occasion emphatically stated, "has
always absolutely respected the Constitution," [9] dissolved the
Chamber.

The only question, therefore, is about the dissolution of the Chamber
elected on 13 June, 1915, which gave M. Venizelos a majority of 56.
This action, it was alleged, violated the spirit, though not the
letter, of Constitutional Law, because the dissolved Chamber
represented the will of the people. But, the other side retorted, it
was precisely because there was ground for believing that the
Parliamentary majority had ceased to represent the will of the people
that the King proceeded to a dissolution; and in so doing he had
excellent precedent. His father had dissolved several Chambers
(specifically in 1902 and 1910) on the same ground, not only without
incurring any censure, but earning much applause from the Venizelist
Party.[10] In fact, the last of those dissolutions had been carried
out by M. Venizelos himself under the following circumstances: The
General Elections of August, 1910, had given a majority to the old
parties: King George, however, in the belief that public opinion really
favoured M. Venizelos, called him to power, though he was only the
leader of a Parliamentary minority. M. Venizelos formed a Government,
but, as the majority in Parliament obstructed his policy, he persuaded
the Sovereign to dissolve it,[11] declaring in the House (11/24
October, 1910): that "it is impossible to limit the prerogative of the
Crown to dissolve any Chamber." Obviously, what was {72} lawful for
King George could not be unlawful for King Constantine; and the fact
that M. Venizelos's majority of 56 had since the recent elections
dwindled to 16, was reason sufficient for the belief that he no longer
represented the will of the people, even if it were conceded that the
issue of war had been clearly put before the electors who had voted for
him in June, and that, at best, a majority of 56 in an assembly of 314
was an adequate expression of the will of the people on so grave an
issue. Events had moved so fast in those months and the situation
changed so abruptly t