troops were
destined solely to the assistance of Servia, who was Greece's ally,
nowise altered the case; for, before the _casus faederis_ was realized,
the neutrality of Greece could not be affected by the danger which
menaced Servia.[16]

To return from formalities to realities. On the same day (2 Oct.), the
Bulgarian forces began to mass on the Servian frontier, while the
Austro-German battalions were fighting their way across the Danube; and
on the 4th Russia launched her ultimatum on Bulgaria. This rapid
fulfilment of their own prognostications roused the Greeks to the
highest pitch of excitement. But all faith in the Entente had not yet
been extinguished. On the very day on which the Petrograd Government
delivered its tardy and ineffectual ultimatum at Sofia, at Athens the
Chamber held a historic debate, in which M. Venizelos for the first
time proclaimed that the Graeco-Servian Treaty imposed an absolute
obligation upon Greece to make war on Bulgaria and Turkey; adding--in
answer to a question, what he would do if on going to Servia's
assistance he met the German and Austrian armies--that Germany and
Austria must be fought as well, if necessary, and backing his thesis
with those appeals to honour which, whether pertinent or not, seldom
fail to move a popular audience. The debate lasted till four o'clock
in the morning and ended with a vote of confidence in M. Venizelos's
military policy--a policy which M. Venizelos, a civilian, expounded to
an assembly of civilians as a settled plan, without waiting for the
consent of the King and in defiance of the technical advice of the
General Staff. In fairness to the Chamber, it should be added that the
motion was carried on the assumption that the King was in agreement.[17]

{63}

But we know King Constantine's attitude; and if M. Venizelos hoped by
these tactics to force his hand, he was speedily undeceived. No sooner
was the debate over than the King summoned his Prime Minister and asked
him to modify his policy or to resign. Faced by such a dilemma, M.
Venizelos did the only thing he could do--he resigned; and his country
shrank back on to the solid ground of neutrality.

It was a narrow escape--how narrow became evident a few hours later.
The Allies had promised to send 150,000 combatants. Even if this
promise had been kept, the Allied force would not have been, in any
strategical sense, an adequate substitute for the Servian contingent.
For it was not in