hest speculations of philosophy, both in
earlier and in later times, and points out, with a clearness and
precision the more valuable because uninfluenced by recent controversies,
the exact field on which the philosophies of the Conditioned and the
Unconditioned come into collision, and the nature of the problem which
they both approach from opposite sides.

What is the meaning of this problem, the solution of which Plato proposes
as the highest aim of philosophy--"to ascend to the unconditioned, and
thence to deduce the universe of conditioned existence?" The problem has
assumed different forms at different times: at present we must content
ourselves with stating it in that in which it will most naturally suggest
itself to a student of modern philosophy, and in which it has the most
direct bearing on the subject of the present article.

All consciousness must in the first instance present itself as a relation
between two constituent parts, the person who is conscious, and the
thing, whatever it may be, of which he is conscious. This contrast has
been indicated, directly or indirectly, by various names--mind and
matter; person and thing; subject and object; or, lastly, in the
distinction, most convenient for philosophy, however uncouth in sound,
between self and not self--the _ego_ and the _non-ego_. In order to be
conscious at all, I must be conscious of something: consciousness thus
presents itself as the product of two factors, _I_ and _something_. The
problem of the unconditioned is, briefly stated, to reduce these two
factors to one.

For it is manifest that, so long as they remain two, we have no
unconditioned, but a pair of conditioned existences. If the _something_
of which I am conscious is a separate reality, having qualities and modes
of action of its own, and thereby determining, or contributing to
determine, the form which my consciousness of it shall take, my
consciousness is thereby conditioned, or partly dependent on something
beyond itself. It is no matter, in this respect, whether the influence is
direct or indirect--whether, for instance, I see a material tree, or only
the mental image of a tree. If the nature of the thing in any degree
determines the character of the image--if the visible form of a tree is
different from that of a house because the tree itself is different from
the house, my consciousness is, however remotely, influenced by something
different from itself, the _ego_ by the _non-ego