same character. If an
act cannot take place except in time, time is the condition of its taking
place. To conceive the unconditioned, as the first link in a chain of
conditioned consequences, it seems necessary that we should conceive
something out of time, yet followed by time; standing at the beginning of
all duration and succession, having no antecedent, but followed by a
series of consequents.
Philosophical theologians have been conscious of this difficulty, almost
from the earliest date at which philosophy and Christian theology came in
contact with each other. From a number of testimonies of similar import,
we select one or two of the most striking. Of the Divine Nature, Gregory
Nyssen says: "It is neither in place nor in time, but before these and
above these in an unspeakable manner, contemplated itself by itself,
through faith alone; neither measured by ages, nor moving along with
times."[B] "In the changes of things," says Augustine, "you will find a
past and a future; in God you will find a present where past and future
cannot be."[C] "Eternity," says Aquinas, "has no succession, but exists
all together."[D] Among divines of the Church of England, we quote two
names only, but those of the highest:--"The duration of eternity," says
Bishop Pearson, "is completely indivisible and all at once; so that it is
ever present, and excludes the other differences of time, past and
future."[E] And Barrow enumerates among natural modes of being and
operation far above our reach, "God's eternity without succession,"
coupling it with "His prescience without necessitation of events."[F]
But it is needless to multiply authorities for a doctrine so familiar to
every student of theology.
[B] _C. Eunom._, i., p. 98, Ed. Gretser.
[C] _In Joann. Evang._, tract. xxxvii. 10.
[D] _Summa_, pars. i., qu. x., art. 1.
[E] _Minor Theol. Works_, vol. i., p. 105.
[F] Sermon on the Unsearchableness of God's Judgments.
Thus, then, our two lines of thought have led us to conclusions which, at
first sight, appear to be contradictory of each other. To be conceived as
unconditioned, God must be conceived as exempt from action in time: to be
conceived as a person, if His personality resembles ours, He must be
conceived as acting in time. Can these two conclusions be reconciled with
each other; and if not, which of them is to be abandoned? The true answer
to this question is, we believe, to be found in a distinction whi
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