enomenalism" with "representationism," runs through
the whole of Mr. Stirling's recent criticism of Hamilton's
theory of perception. It is curious, however, that the
very passage (_Lectures_, i., p. 146) which Mr. Mill cites
as proving that Hamilton, in spite of his professed
phenomenalism, was an unconscious noumenalist, is
employed by Mr. Stirling to prove that, in spite of his
professed presentationism, he was an unconscious
representationist. The two critics tilt at Hamilton
from opposite quarters: he has only to stand aside and let
them run against each other.

Under this explanation, it is manifest that the doctrine, that matter as
a subject or substratum of attributes is unknown and unknowable, is
totally different from that of cosmothetic idealism, with which Mr Mill
confounds it;[AI] and that a philosopher may without inconsistency
accept the former and reject the latter. The former, while it holds the
material substance to be unknown, does not deny that some of the
attributes of matter are perceived immediately as material, though, it
may be, modified by contact with mind. The latter maintains that the
attributes, as well as the substance, are not perceived immediately as
material, but mediately through the intervention of immaterial
representatives. It is also manifest that, in answer to Mr. Mill's
question, which of Hamilton's two "cardinal doctrines," Relativity or
Natural Realism, "is to be taken in a non-natural sense,"[AJ] we must
say, neither. The two doctrines are quite compatible with each other, and
neither requires a non-natural interpretation to reconcile it to its
companion.

[AI] _Examination_, p. 23.

[AJ] _Examination_, p. 20.

The doctrine of relativity derives its chief practical value from its
connection with the next great doctrine of Hamilton's philosophy, the
incognisability of the Absolute and the Infinite. For this doctrine
brings Ontology into contact with Theology; and it is only in relation to
theology that ontology acquires a practical importance. With respect to
the other two "ideas of the pure reason," as Kant calls them, the human
soul and the world, the question, whether we know them as realities or as
phenomena, may assist us in dealing with certain metaphysical
difficulties, but need not affect our practical conduct. For we have an
immediate intuition of the attributes of mind and matter, at least a