when the new nature of God begins to be better than the
old! Mr. Mill would perhaps have spoken of Hamilton's
argument with more respect had he known that it is taken
from Plato.

On this we would remark, _en passant_, that this is precisely
Hamilton's own doctrine, that the sphere of our belief is more extensive
than that of our knowledge. The purport of Hamilton's argument is to show
that the Absolute, as conceived by Cousin, is not a true Absolute
(_Infinito-Absolute_), and therefore does not represent the real nature
of God. His argument is this: "Cousin's Absolute exists merely as a
cause: God does not exist merely as a cause: therefore Cousin's Absolute
is not God." Mr. Mill actually mistakes the position which Hamilton is
opposing for that which he is maintaining. Such an error does not lead
us to expect much from his subsequent refutation.

His first criticism is a curious specimen of his reading in philosophy.
He says:--

"When the True or the Beautiful are spoken of, the phrase is meant
to include all things whatever that are true, or all things
whatever that are beautiful. If this rule is good for other
abstractions, it is good for the Absolute. The word is devoid of
meaning unless in reference to predicates of some sort.... If we
are told, therefore, that there is some Being who is, or which is,
the Absolute,--not something absolute, but the Absolute
itself,--the proposition can be understood in no other sense than
that the supposed Being possesses in absolute completeness _all_
predicates; is absolutely good and absolutely bad; absolutely wise
and absolutely stupid; and so forth."[AO]--(P. 43.)

[AO] In support of this position, Mr. Mill cites Hegel--"What
kind of an absolute Being is that which does not contain
in itself all that is actual, even evil included?" We
are not concerned to defend Hegel's position; but he was
not quite so absurd as to mean what Mr. Mill supposes
him to have meant. Does not Mr. Mill know that it was
one of Hegel's fundamental positions, that the Divine
nature cannot be expressed by a plurality of
predicates?

Plato expressly distinguishes between "the beautiful" and "things that
are beautiful," as the One in contrast to the Many--the Real in contrast
to the Apparent.[AP] It is, of course, quite possible that Plato may be
wrong, and Mr. Mill right; but the mere fact o