riticisms may be very briefly dismissed.
First, Hamilton does _not_, as Mr. Mill asserts, say that "the
Unconditioned is inconceivable, because it includes both the Infinite and
the Absolute, and these are contradictory of one another." His argument
is a common disjunctive syllogism. The unconditioned, if conceivable at
all, must be conceived _either_ as the absolute _or_ as the infinite;
neither of these is possible; therefore the unconditioned is not
conceivable at all. Nor, secondly, is Sir W. Hamilton guilty of the
"strange confusion of ideas" which Mr. Mill ascribes to him, when he says
that the Absolute, as being absolutely One, cannot be known under the
conditions of plurality and difference. The absolute, as such, must be
out of all relation, and consequently cannot be conceived in the relation
of plurality. "The plurality required," says Mr. Mill, "is not within the
thing itself, but is made up between itself and other things." It is, in
fact, both; but even granting Mr. Mill's assumption, what is a "plurality
between a thing and other things" but a relation between them? There is
undoubtedly a "strange confusion of ideas" in this paragraph; but the
confusion is not on the part of Sir W. Hamilton. "Again," continues Mr.
Mill, "even if we concede that a thing cannot be known at all unless
known as plural, does it follow that it cannot be known as plural because
it is also One? Since when have the One and the Many been incompatible
things, instead of different aspects of the same thing?... If there is
any meaning in the words, must not Absolute Unity be Absolute Plurality
likewise?" Mr. Mill's "since when?" may be answered in the words of
Plato:--"[Greek: Ouden emoige atopon dokei heinai ei hen hapanta
apophainei tis to metechein. tou henos kai tauta tauta polla to
plethous au metechein; all' ei ho estin hen, auto touto polla apodeixei,
kai au ta polla de hen, touto ede thaumasomai.]"[AV] Here we are
expressly told that "absolute unity" cannot be "absolute plurality." Mr.
Mill may say that Plato is wrong; but he will hardly go so far as to say
that there is no meaning in his words. In point of fact, however, it is
Mr. Mill who is in error, and not Plato. In different relations, no
doubt, the same concrete object may be regarded as one or as many. The
same measure is one foot or twelve inches; the same sum is one shilling
or twelve pence; but it no more follows that "absolute unity must be
absolute plurality likewis