e," than it follows from the above instances
that one is equal to twelve. And, thirdly, when Mr. Mill accuses Sir W.
Hamilton of departing from his own meaning of the term _absolute_, in
maintaining that the Absolute cannot be a Cause, he only shows that he
does not himself know what Hamilton's meaning is. "If Absolute," he says,
"means finished, perfected, completed, may there not be a finished,
perfected, and completed Cause?" Hamilton's Absolute is that which is
"_out of relation_, as finished, perfect, complete;" and a Cause, as
such, is both in relation and incomplete. It is in relation to its
effect; and it is incomplete without its effect. Finally, when Mr. Mill
charges Sir W. Hamilton with maintaining "that extension and figure are
of the essence of matter, and perceived as such by intuition," we must
briefly reply that Hamilton does no such thing. He is not speaking of the
essence of matter _per se_, but only of matter as apprehended in relation
to us.

[AV] _Parmenides_, p. 129.

Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with an attempt to discover the meaning
of Hamilton's assertion, "to think is to condition." We have already
explained what Hamilton meant by this expression; and we recur to the
subject now, only to show the easy manner in which Mr. Mill manages to
miss the point of an argument with the clue lying straight before him.
"Did any," he says (of those who say that the Absolute is thinkable),
"profess to think it in any other manner than by distinguishing it from
other things?" Now this is the very thing which, according to Hamilton,
Schelling actually did. Mr. Mill does not attempt to show that Hamilton
is wrong in his interpretation of Schelling, nor, if he is right, what
were the reasons which led Schelling to so paradoxical a position: he
simply assumes that no man could hold Schelling's view, and there is an
end of it.[AW] Hamilton's purpose is to reassert in substance the
doctrine which Kant maintained, and which Schelling denied; and the
natural way to ascertain his meaning would be by reference to these two
philosophers. But this is not the method of Mr. Mill, here or elsewhere.
He generally endeavours to ascertain Hamilton's meaning by ranging the
wide field of possibilities. He tells us what a phrase means in certain
authors of whom Hamilton is not thinking, or in reference to certain
matters which Hamilton is not discussing; but he hardly ever attempts to
trace the history of Hamilton's own vie