s
phenomenal objects, and by these intuitions may be tested the accuracy of
the conceptions derived from them, sufficiently for all practical
purposes. A man will equally avoid walking over a precipice, and is
logically as consistent in avoiding it, whether he regard the precipice
as a real thing, or as a mere phenomenon. But in the province of theology
this is not the case. We have no immediate intuition of the Divine
attributes, even as phenomena; we only infer their existence and nature
from certain similar attributes of which we are immediately conscious in
ourselves. And hence arises the question, How far does the similarity
extend, and to what extent is the accuracy of our conceptions guaranteed
by the intuition, not of the object to be conceived, but of something
more or less nearly resembling it? But this is not all. Our knowledge of
God, originally derived from personal consciousness, receives accession
from two other sources--from the external world, as His work; and from
revelation, as His word; and the conclusions derived from each have to be
compared together. Should any discrepancy arise between them, are we at
once warranted in rejecting one class of conclusions in favour of the
other two, or two in favour of the third? or are we at liberty to say
that our knowledge in respect of all alike is of such an imperfect and
indirect character that we are warranted in believing that some
reconciliation may exist, though our ignorance prevents us from
discovering what it is? Here at least is a practical question of the very
highest importance. In the early part of our previous remarks, we have
endeavoured to show how this question has been answered by orthodox
theologians of various ages, and how Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy
supports that answer. We have now to consider Mr Mill's chapter of
criticisms.

It is always unfortunate to make a stumble on the threshold; and Mr.
Mill's opening paragraph makes two. "The name of God," he says, "is
veiled under two extremely abstract phrases, 'the Infinite and the
Absolute.'... But it is one of the most unquestionable of all logical
maxims, that the meaning of the abstract must be sought in the concrete,
and not conversely."[AK]--Now, in the first place, "the Infinite" and
"the Absolute," even in the sense in which they are both predicable of
God, are no more names of God than "the creature" and "the finite" are
names of man. They are the names of certain attributes, which f