onceiving, yet indicate them as
analogous, not as identical; that we may naturally expect to find points
where this analogy will fail us, where the function of the Infinite Moral
Governor will be distinct from that of the finite moral servant; and
where, consequently, we shall be liable to error in judging by human
rules of the ways of God, whether manifested in nature or in revelation.
Such is the true lesson to be learnt from a philosophy which tells us of
a God who is "in a certain sense revealed, in a certain sense
concealed--at once known and unknown."
[R] _Lectures_, vol. i., p. 30.
[S] _Lectures_, vol. i, p. 33.
[T] _Ibid._, p. 42.
It is not surprising that this philosophy, when compared with that of a
critic like Mr. Mill, should stand out in clear and sharp antagonism. Mr.
Mill is one of the most distinguished representatives of that school of
Materialism which Sir W. Hamilton denounces as virtual Atheism. We do not
mean that he consciously adopts the grosser tenets of the materialists.
We are not aware that he has ever positively denied the existence of a
soul distinct from the body, or maintained that the brain secretes
thought as the liver secretes bile. But he is the advocate of a
philosophical method which makes the belief in the existence of an
immaterial principle superfluous and incongruous; he not only
acknowledges no such distinction between the phenomena of mind and those
of matter as to require the hypothesis of a free intelligence to account
for it; he not only regards the ascertained laws of coexistence and
succession in material phenomena as the type and rule according to which
all phenomena whatever--those of internal consciousness no less than of
external observation--are to be tested; but he even expressly denies the
existence of that free will which Sir W. Hamilton regards as the
indispensable condition of all morality and all religion.[U] Thus,
instead of recognising in the facts of intelligence "an order of
existence diametrically in contrast to that displayed to us in the facts
of the material universe,"[V] he regards both classes of facts as of
the same kind, and explicable by the same laws; he abolishes the primary
contrast of consciousness between the _ego_ and the _non-ego_--the person
and the thing; he reduces man to a thing, instead of a person,--to one
among the many phenomena of the universe, determined by the same laws of
invariable antecedence and consequence, in
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