ch some
recent critics regard with very little favour,--the distinction between
Reason and Faith; between the power of _conceiving_ and that of
_believing_. We cannot, in our present state of knowledge, reconcile
these two conclusions; yet we are not required to abandon either. We
cannot conceive the manner in which the unconditioned and the personal
are united in the Divine Nature; yet we may believe that, in some manner
unknown to us, they are so united. To conceive the union of two
attributes in one object of thought, I must be able to conceive them as
united in some particular manner: when this cannot be done, I may
nevertheless believe _that_ the union is possible, though I am unable to
conceive _how_ it is possible. The problem is thus represented as one of
those Divine mysteries, the character of which is clearly and well
described in the language of Leibnitz:--"Il en est de meme des autres
mysteres, ou les esprits moderes trouveront toujours une explication
suffisante pour croire, et jamais autant qu'il en faut pour comprendre.
Il nous suffit d'un certain _ce que c'est_ ([Greek: ti esti]) mais le
_comment_ ([Greek: pos]) nous passe, et ne nous est point
necessaire."[G]

[G] _Theodicee, Discours de la Conformite de la Foi avec
la Raison, Sec. 56._ Leibnitz, it will be observed, uses
the expression _pour comprendre_, for which, in the
preceding remarks, we have substituted _to conceive_.
The change has been made intentionally, on account of an
ambiguity in the former word. Sometimes it is used, as
Leibnitz here uses it, to denote an apprehension of the
manner in which certain attributes can coexist in an
object. But sometimes (to say nothing of other senses)
it is used to signify a complete knowledge of an object
in all its properties and their consequences, such as it
may be questioned whether we have of any object
whatever. This ambiguity, which has been the source of
much confusion and much captious criticism, is well
pointed out by Norris in his _Reason and Faith_ (written
in reply to Toland), p. 118, Ed. 1697: "When we say that
_above reason_ is when we do not comprehend or perceive
the truth of a thing, this must not be meant of not
comprehending the truth in its whole latitude and
extent, so that as many truths should be said to be
above reason as we cannot thus t