re among the most important. Thus, if I
recognize a thing, the occasion of its previous existence in virtue
of which I recognize it forms part of "my experience" by DEFINITION:
recognition will be one of the marks by which my experience is singled
out from the rest of the world. Of course, the words "this has existed
before" are a very inadequate translation of what actually happens when
we form a judgment of recognition, but that is unavoidable: words are
framed to express a level of thought which is by no means primitive,
and are quite incapable of expressing such an elementary occurrence as
recognition. I shall return to what is virtually the same question in
connection with true memory, which raises exactly similar problems.
A second point is that, when we recognize something, it was not in fact
the very same thing, but only something similar, that we experienced on
a former occasion. Suppose the object in question is a friend's face. A
person's face is always changing, and is not exactly the same on any two
occasions. Common sense treats it as one face with varying expressions;
but the varying expressions actually exist, each at its proper time,
while the one face is merely a logical construction. We regard two
objects as the same, for common-sense purposes, when the reaction they
call for is practically the same. Two visual appearances, to both
of which it is appropriate to say: "Hullo, Jones!" are treated as
appearances of one identical object, namely Jones. The name "Jones" is
applicable to both, and it is only reflection that shows us that many
diverse particulars are collected together to form the meaning of the
name "Jones." What we see on any one occasion is not the whole series of
particulars that make up Jones, but only one of them (or a few in quick
succession). On another occasion we see another member of the series,
but it is sufficiently similar to count as the same from the standpoint
of common sense. Accordingly, when we judge "I have seen THIS
before," we judge falsely if "this" is taken as applying to the actual
constituent of the world that we are seeing at the moment. The
word "this" must be interpreted vaguely so as to include anything
sufficiently like what we are seeing at the moment. Here, again, we
shall find a similar point as regards true memory; and in connection
with true memory we will consider the point again. It is sometimes
suggested, by those who favour behaviourist views, that reco
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