memory, as throughout the analysis of knowledge, there are
two very distinct problems, namely (1) as to the nature of the present
occurrence in knowing; (2) as to the relation of this occurrence to what
is known. When we remember, the knowing is now, while what is known is
in the past. Our two questions are, in the case of memory:

(1) What is the present occurrence when we remember?

(2) What is the relation of this present occurrence to the past event
which is remembered?

Of these two questions, only the first concerns the psychologist; the
second belongs to theory of knowledge. At the same time, if we accept
the vague datum with which we began, to the effect that, in some sense,
there is knowledge of the past, we shall have to find, if we can, such
an account of the present occurrence in remembering as will make it not
impossible for remembering to give us knowledge of the past. For the
present, however, we shall do well to forget the problems concerning
theory of knowledge, and concentrate upon the purely psychological
problem of memory.

Between memory-image and sensation there is an intermediate experience
concerning the immediate past. For example, a sound that we have just
heard is present to us in a way which differs both from the sensation
while we are hearing the sound and from the memory-image of something
heard days or weeks ago. James states that it is this way of
apprehending the immediate past that is "the ORIGINAL of our experience
of pastness, from whence we get the meaning of the term"("Psychology,"
i, p. 604). Everyone knows the experience of noticing (say) that
the clock HAS BEEN striking, when we did not notice it while it was
striking. And when we hear a remark spoken, we are conscious of the
earlier words while the later ones are being uttered, and this retention
feels different from recollection of something definitely past. A
sensation fades gradually, passing by continuous gradations to the
status of an image. This retention of the immediate past in a condition
intermediate between sensation and image may be called "immediate
memory." Everything belonging to it is included with sensation in what
is called the "specious present." The specious present includes elements
at all stages on the journey from sensation to image. It is this fact
that enables us to apprehend such things as movements, or the order of
the words in a spoken sentence. Succession can occur within the specious
present, o