ge and anything very like it,
including its prototype. "Existence" expresses the feeling of a
"reality" aroused primarily by whatever can have effects upon us without
our voluntary co-operation. The word "of" in the phrase "the existence
of this" represents the relation which subsists between the feeling of
reality and the "this."

This analysis of memory is probably extremely faulty, but I do not know
how to improve it.

NOTE.-When I speak of a FEELING of belief, I use the word "feeling" in
a popular sense, to cover a sensation or an image or a complex of
sensations or images or both; I use this word because I do not wish to
commit myself to any special analysis of the belief-feeling.

LECTURE X. WORDS AND MEANING

The problem with which we shall be concerned in this lecture is the
problem of determining what is the relation called "meaning." The word
"Napoleon," we say, "means" a certain person. In saying this, we are
asserting a relation between the word "Napoleon" and the person so
designated. It is this relation that we must now investigate.

Let us first consider what sort of object a word is when considered
simply as a physical thing, apart from its meaning. To begin with, there
are many instances of a word, namely all the different occasions when it
is employed. Thus a word is not something unique and particular, but a
set of occurrences. If we confine ourselves to spoken words, a word has
two aspects, according as we regard it from the point of view of the
speaker or from that of the hearer. From the point of view of the
speaker, a single instance of the use of a word consists of a certain
set of movements in the throat and mouth, combined with breath. From
the point of view of the hearer, a single instance of the use of a
word consists of a certain series of sounds, each being approximately
represented by a single letter in writing, though in practice a letter
may represent several sounds, or several letters may represent one
sound. The connection between the spoken word and the word as it reaches
the hearer is causal. Let us confine ourselves to the spoken word, which
is the more important for the analysis of what is called "thought."
Then we may say that a single instance of the spoken word consists of
a series of movements, and the word consists of a whole set of such
series, each member of the set being very similar to each other member.
That is to say, any two instances of the word "Napoleon" a