ents that go to make
up the collections we call things or persons. If we want to speak of
such existents--which hardly happens except in philosophy--we have to do
it by means of some elaborate phrase, such as "the visual sensation
which occupied the centre of my field of vision at noon on January 1,
1919." Such ultimate simples I call "particulars." Particulars MIGHT
have proper names, and no doubt would have if language had been invented
by scientifically trained observers for purposes of philosophy and
logic. But as language was invented for practical ends, particulars have
remained one and all without a name.

We are not, in practice, much concerned with the actual particulars
that come into our experience in sensation; we are concerned rather
with whole systems to which the particulars belong and of which they
are signs. What we see makes us say "Hullo, there's Jones," and the fact
that what we see is a sign of Jones (which is the case because it is one
of the particulars that make up Jones) is more interesting to us than
the actual particular itself. Hence we give the name "Jones" to the
whole set of particulars, but do not trouble to give separate names to
the separate particulars that make up the set.

Passing on from proper names, we come next to general names, such as
"man," "cat," "triangle." A word such as "man" means a whole class
of such collections of particulars as have proper names. The several
members of the class are assembled together in virtue of some similarity
or common property. All men resemble each other in certain important
respects; hence we want a word which shall be equally applicable to all
of them. We only give proper names to the individuals of a species when
they differ inter se in practically important respects. In other cases
we do not do this. A poker, for instance, is just a poker; we do not
call one "John" and another "Peter."

There is a large class of words, such as "eating," "walking,"
"speaking," which mean a set of similar occurrences. Two instances of
walking have the same name because they resemble each other, whereas
two instances of Jones have the same name because they are causally
connected. In practice, however, it is difficult to make any precise
distinction between a word such as "walking" and a general name such as
"man." One instance of walking cannot be concentrated into an instant:
it is a process in time, in which there is a causal connection between
the earlie