ver, it would be destitute of meaning. But
according to Hume's principle, the simple elements in an image,
at least, are derived from prototypes-except possibly in very rare
exceptional cases. Often, in such instances as our image of a friend's
face or of a nondescript dog, an image is not derived from one
prototype, but from many; when this happens, the image is vague, and
blurs the features in which the various prototypes differ. To arrive
at the meaning of the image in such a case, we observe that there are
certain respects, notably associations, in which the effects of images
resemble those of their prototypes. If we find, in a given case, that
our vague image, say, of a nondescript dog, has those associative
effects which all dogs would have, but not those belonging to any
special dog or kind of dog, we may say that our image means "dog" in
general. If it has all the associations appropriate to spaniels but
no others, we shall say it means "spaniel"; while if it has all the
associations appropriate to one particular dog, it will mean that dog,
however vague it may be as a picture. The meaning of an image, according
to this analysis, is constituted by a combination of likeness and
associations. It is not a sharp or definite conception, and in many
cases it will be impossible to decide with any certainty what an image
means. I think this lies in the nature of things, and not in defective
analysis.

We may give somewhat more precision to the above account of the meaning
of images, and extend it to meaning in general. We find sometimes that,
IN MNEMIC CAUSATION, an image or word, as stimulus, has the same effect
(or very nearly the same effect) as would belong to some object, say,
a certain dog. In that case we say that the image or word means that
object. In other cases the mnemic effects are not all those of one
object, but only those shared by objects of a certain kind, e.g. by all
dogs. In this case the meaning of the image or word is general: it means
the whole kind. Generality and particularity are a matter of degree. If
two particulars differ sufficiently little, their mnemic effects will be
the same; therefore no image or word can mean the one as opposed to the
other; this sets a bound to the particularity of meaning. On the other
hand, the mnemic effects of a number of sufficiently dissimilar objects
will have nothing discoverable in common; hence a word which aims at
complete generality, such as "entity" for