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we make some special effort of recollection, the face is likely to come
before us with an average expression, very blurred and vague, but we can
at will recall how our friend looked on some special occasion when he
was pleased or angry or unhappy, and this enables us to realize the
generalized character of the vague image.
There is, however, another way of distinguishing between the vague, the
particular and the general, and this is not by their content, but by
the reaction which they produce. A word, for example, may be said to be
vague when it is applicable to a number of different individuals, but to
each as individuals; the name Smith, for example, is vague: it is always
meant to apply to one man, but there are many men to each of whom it
applies.* The word "man," on the other hand, is general. We say, "This
is Smith," but we do not say "This is man," but "This is a man." Thus
we may say that a word embodies a vague idea when its effects are
appropriate to an individual, but are the same for various similar
individuals, while a word embodies a general idea when its effects are
different from those appropriate to individuals. In what this difference
consists it is, however, not easy to say. I am inclined to think that it
consists merely in the knowledge that no one individual is represented,
so that what distinguishes a general idea from a vague idea is merely
the presence of a certain accompanying belief. If this view is correct,
a general idea differs from a vague one in a way analogous to that in
which a memory-image differs from an imagination-image. There also
we found that the difference consists merely of the fact that a
memory-image is accompanied by a belief, in this case as to the past.
* "Smith" would only be a quite satisfactory representation
of vague words if we failed to discriminate between
different people called Smith.
It should also be said that our images even of quite particular
occurrences have always a greater or a less degree of vagueness. That is
to say, the occurrence might have varied within certain limits without
causing our image to vary recognizably. To arrive at the general it
is necessary that we should be able to contrast it with a number of
relatively precise images or words for particular occurrences; so long
as all our images and words are vague, we cannot arrive at the contrast
by which the general is defined. This is the justification for the
view which I q
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